

# Restorers Of Hope: Shaping Conditions For Success Against Al-Qaeda's Regional Insurgency

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**Title:** Restorers of Hope: Shaping Conditions for Success Against Al-Qaeda's Regional Insurgency.

**Author:** Major Roger D. Cotton, United States Army Reserve

**Thesis:** U.S. Army Civil Affairs are critical to conducting a successful counter-insurgency campaign against Al-Queda.

**Discussion:** Al-Queda's goal is to create an Islamist region ruled by religious authorities. Their attack against the United States was designed to remove U.S. influence and involvement in their insurgency. They will attempt to mobilize the people with propaganda and terrorism to topple the governments in the region. The key to defeating an insurgency is to realize that the people are the battlefield, and winning their support involves protecting them from the insurgent, while fostering changes to address the issues that sparked the insurgency and to provide hope. U.S. Army Civil Affairs soldiers have the regional alignment, cultural awareness, language abilities and civilian-acquired skills required to conduct Civil-Military Operations (CMO) in counter-insurgency operations. Two critical missions that they can perform for counter-insurgency are Population and Resources Control (PRC) and Humanitarian Assistance (HA). In the case studies of the Malay Emergency of 1948, the United States Marine Corps Combined Action Program of 1965, and Operation Home Depot in 2002, CMO were key to success. Each highlighted the importance of taking the fight to the enemy with armed forces, but more importantly, conducting PRC and HA to "win the hearts and minds" of the population and isolate the insurgents from the population, both physically and psychologically. The dual approach of combat operations and CMO can defeat Islamist terrorism by destroying the roots of support. It can also foster democracy and capitalism through their interaction with the Muslim culture. Civil Affairs units should be assigned to conventional units down to battalion-level, and with other Special Operations Forces, to maximize their interaction with both civilians on the battlefield, and agencies that want to assist the developing nations. Additionally, they should be assigned on a permanent basis at geographic commands.

**Conclusion:** Populace and Resource Controls and Humanitarian Assistance are vital missions for U.S. Army Civil Affairs engaged in the Global War on Terrorism. Their success will help secure the victory over terrorism.

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## *Preface*

This paper would not have been possible without the assistance of my wife and editor, Danielle, who allowed me the time to conduct research and writing. Without her support, there would have been no paper.

I want to thank Major Bob Goodsell and the instructors at the Civil Affairs Course at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, for their expert instruction that inspired my personal search on how the U.S. Army Civil Affairs can “secure the victory” in the Global War on Terrorism.

I want to thank Doctors Kamal Beyoghlow and Norman Cigar for their insightful instruction into Middle East issues. The depth and breadth of their knowledge on these subjects astounds me and their availability for advice was greatly appreciated.

I particularly want to thank my friend Lieutenant Commander Sultan Al-Saud, of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, for insights into the complexities of the Middle Eastern issues related to Al-Queda and terrorism. Our almost daily discussions gave me a valuable insider’s view of the Arab perspective on U.S. policies and on Muslim life.

I want to thank Brigadier General John H. Kern, Colonel George Pogge, and Lieutenant Colonel James D. Owens, Jr., from the 352<sup>nd</sup> Civil Affairs Command (CACOM) for taking time out of their busy schedules to discuss civil-military operations in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom. Their willingness to provide honest, detailed information gave me valuable first-hand knowledge of their experiences in Afghanistan.

## *Introduction*

Carl Von Clausewitz said, “No one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so – without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective.”<sup>1</sup> On 11 September 2001, the transnational terrorist organization, Al-Queda, attacked the American homeland in a dramatic and devastating manner. This blow was part of a regional insurgency designed to coerce the United States to leave the Middle East so they could gain regional control of the Middle Eastern region through radical Islamization. The key to defeating an insurgency is to realize that the people are the battlefield, and winning their support involves protecting them from the insurgent, fostering changes to address the issues that sparked the insurgency, and providing hope. While terrorists specialize in eliminating hope for peace, freedom, and a better way of life, U.S. Army Civil Affairs specialize in restoring hope. These quiet professionals are regionally aligned with the United States military geographic commands and have the language and cultural expertise required in their assigned areas. Civil Affairs units are the bridge builders between combat operations and long-term development programs, and are critical to successfully defeating Al-Queda’s regional insurgency and bringing freedom to the oppressed.

U.S. Army Civil Affairs conduct civil-military operations (CMO) to “win the hearts and minds” of the population and isolate the insurgents from the population, both physically and psychologically. Two CMO missions that are important to successful counter-insurgency campaigns are Population and Resources Control (PRC) and

Humanitarian Assistance (HA). PRC operations focus on providing security for the populace, denying personnel and materiel to the enemy, mobilizing population and materiel resources, and detecting and reducing the effectiveness of enemy agents. Examples include such programs as movement restrictions, travel permits, regulations and checkpoints. These actions can help to sever the connection between the terrorists and the populace. HA programs are conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Examples of HA programs include providing food, digging wells, and building schools. Civil Affairs units are trained and organized to conduct these missions and quickly transfer the responsibility to the host nation government or international organizations, who can continue to make long-term internal defense and development improvements.

In the remainder of this paper, I will prove that Al-Queda is seeking to create a radical Islamist region through an insurgency. I will draw parallels between their methods and those of the Viet Cong during the Vietnam War. I propose that they will attempt to block US involvement, then mobilize the Muslim population to join the insurgency. After creating popular support, Al-Queda will try to eliminate existing pro-Western Islamic governments, in favor of a regional Islamic empire. I will then discuss principles of successful counter-insurgency operations: the populace must be secure with their basic needs addressed, the government must be assisted in conducting its own programs for internal defense and development, and the insurgent must be eliminated. I

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<sup>1</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Everyman's Library, New York,

will then analyze three case studies of previous, successful counter-insurgency (COIN) campaigns: Britain's Malay Emergency, the Marine Corps CAP program in Vietnam, and Operation Home Depot in Afghanistan. Each of these will highlight these principles of taking the fight to the enemy with armed forces, but more importantly, conducting CMO. The paper will then conclude with recommendations for including CMO in counter-insurgency operations, to include rules of engagement, host nation development initiatives and team structure, and integration of soldiers into local villages. I will discuss the value of the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) to passing the responsibility of CMO to host nation and non-governmental organizations, and the importance of structuring U.S. forces to include Civil Affairs experts at the battalion-level for conventional forces and at the geographic command headquarters for planning.

### *Al-Queda, Dau Tranh & COIN*

To discuss the requirements for CMO in this insurgency, it is important to first understand the roots of the conflict. The attack on September 11 was the catalyst for the Bush Administration's initiative named the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and ushered in a new strategic focus.

The attack took place on American soil, but it was an attack on the heart and soul of the civilized world. And the world has come together to fight a new and different war, the first, and we hope the only one, of the 21st century. A war against all those who seek to export terror, and a war against those governments that support or shelter them.

*-President George W. Bush, 10/11/01*

President Bush outlined five objectives for the initial phases of the GWOT. The worldwide coalition would 1) begin to destroy al-Queda's grip on Afghanistan by driving



the Taliban from power, 2) disrupt al-Queda's global operations and terrorist financing networks, 3) destroy al-Queda terrorist training camps, 4) help the innocent people of Afghanistan recover from the Taliban's reign of terror, and 5) help Afghans put aside long-standing differences to form a new interim government that represents all Afghans – including women.<sup>2</sup> The President leveraged diplomatic, informational, military and economic elements of national power and included a global law enforcement effort, increased humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, restructured homeland security, and respect for Islam to prepare for war. This monumental effort was unique in its approach and grand in its scope, but the threat of terrorism to the United States is not new.

While United States citizens bore the brunt of 11 September 2002, this was not the first terrorist attack against the United States from Al-Queda. Numerous attacks have been made by Al-Queda or indirectly through training and support from Al-Queda to other terrorist groups for the past few decades. For the 11 September attack, their chosen base of operations was Afghanistan, a country whose history includes harboring the leader of Al-Queda, Osama bin Laden. Afghanistan's history is filled with turbulence and oppression. Afghanistan is a very rural, mountainous country that is located along historic trade and invasion routes between Central and South Asia. Its people are ethnically and linguistically mixed due to their location and the "nation" has a largely tribal loyalty (the Pashtun tribes are dominant), with an aversion to national governments. Afghan history is filled with foreign invaders from Alexander the Great to the Arabs, Persians, Turks, Mongols and British. On August 19, 1919, the Afghanis celebrated their

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<sup>2</sup> *The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days* (The Coalition Information Centers, Washington, D.C. 2001), 3.

Independence Day from British occupation.<sup>3</sup> Subsequent kings attempted to modernize the nation and included tolerance for extremist political parties, such as the communists. In 1978, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) seized power in a coup. Instability plagued the country and resulted in the Soviet invasion in 1979 to assist the communist government contain a growing insurgency. The Afghans responded with a fragmented, peasant-based resistance led by tribal leaders. They had no general strategy, no coordination, no organization other than traditional ties to tribe, region and family"<sup>4</sup> These were the mujahidin, or freedom fighters. Their goal was simply freedom from the Soviet occupation, which they achieved in 1989.

Following the Soviet withdrawal, a civil war continued among various mujahidin factions. In reaction to anarchy, tribal warlordism, and a lack of Pashtun representation in the Kabul government, a group known as the "Taliban" (meaning pupil) took power. Most were of rural Pashtun origin and were educated in the madrassas (religious schools) of Pakistan where radical Islamization was heavily emphasized. With considerable support from Pakistan, "this group dedicated itself to removing the warlords, providing order, and imposing...an extreme interpretation of Islam – based in part on rural Pashtun tradition – upon the entire country and committed massive human rights violations, particularly directed against women and girls, in the process."<sup>5</sup> Their theology was more anti-modernist and anti-Western than Islamic and found popularity among poor and disenfranchised Muslims in the Islamic world. Severe restrictions were placed on

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<sup>3</sup> *Background Note: Afghanistan* (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of South Asian Affairs, June 2002, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380pf.htm>), 2-3.

<sup>4</sup> Gerard Chaliand, editor. *Guerilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan* (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1982) 328-329.

<sup>5</sup> Background Note, 6.

Afghans concerning dress, hair length, and facial hair. Women suffered segregation from men, were required to wear strict Islamic garb in public, were denied educations, and were denied the delivery of humanitarian and medical assistance.<sup>6</sup>

From the mid-1990s, the Taliban provided sanctuary to a former mujahidin member named Usama (or Osama) bin Laden. In return, Bin Laden provided financial and political support to the Taliban. The son of a Saudi Arabian construction company owner, Bin Laden used his family's connections and wealth to provide assistance to the mujahidin during the Soviet occupation. The experience of victoriously evicting the invading Soviet Union shaped his thoughts and plans for his future. Bin Laden formed his Al-Queda organization near the end of the war and returned to Saudi Arabia, where he supported anti-Saudi monarchy groups, until he was evicted in 1994. Bin Laden and his Al-Queda (Arabic for "the base") organization are believed to operate training camps in Afghanistan and Sudan and have ties to other terrorist organizations in Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Chechnya, Philippines, Egypt, Albania, Bosnia, Algeria, Tunisia, Uruguay and Ecuador.<sup>7</sup>

Al-Queda's desire to return Muslim nations to a strict interpretation of Islamic law is an outgrowth of the Arabic quest for modernity that began after World War I and continues today. Arab leaders wanted to gain the benefits they saw in the Western world: modern societies, dynamic economies and powerful armies. These dreams were dashed after the humiliating defeat at the hands of Israel in 1967. This defeat was known in Arabic as *al nakba*, the catastrophe. This deepened the quest for modernity for many

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<sup>6</sup> Anthony Miccarelli, *Afghanistan Primer* (Virtual Information Center, (808) 477-3661, 17 Sept 2001), 12.

<sup>7</sup> Afghanistan, Terrorism, and Osama bin Laden (briefing from U.S. Army 1<sup>st</sup> Corps), 6.

Arab leaders, but many thinkers, known as “Islamic fundamentalists or Islamists,” argued that the Arab world needed to turn towards their Islamic roots, instead of pursuing western trends.<sup>8</sup> Concurrent with advocating structural changes, the fundamentalists sought to influence society at the individual level, rather than just the national level, to spark a return to Islamic rule. The encouragement to conduct *jihad*, or spiritual struggle, by fighting evil and returning to Islam, includes fighting infidels in society, as well as evil forces and one’s own sinful nature. This dual emphasis, on structural governmental change and individual participation, to push out infidels present in the Muslim world, set up Westerners as the godless *infidels* who were using their technological and economic domination to oppress the Islamic world.

In Osama bin Laden’s words, his strategic aim is to "unite all Muslims and to establish a government which follows the rule of the Caliphs." Bin Laden has stated that the only way to establish the Caliphate is by force. Al-Qaeda's goal, therefore, is to overthrow nearly all Muslim governments, which Bin Laden views as "corrupt," to drive Western influence from those countries, and eventually to abolish state boundaries.”<sup>9</sup> Al-Queda is conducting a regional insurgency, that is, an “organized, armed political struggle aimed at obtaining control of the government.”<sup>10</sup> Insurgency may also be defined as “a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources...and violence to destroy,


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<sup>8</sup> Ahmed S. Hashim, “The World According to Usama Bin Laden,” *Naval War College Review* (Col. LIV, No. 4), (Autumn 2001), 15.

<sup>9</sup> Department of State, *U.S. Government Factsheet on Osama bin Laden*, [www.usembassy.state.gov/posts/af1/wwwwhtr01.html](http://www.usembassy.state.gov/posts/af1/wwwwhtr01.html).

<sup>10</sup> CSM, U.S. Army (Ret), James J. Gallagher, *Low-Intensity Conflict: A Guide for Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (Stackpole Books, Harrisburg, PA, 1992), 33.

reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.”<sup>11</sup> This describes Al-Queda’s strategic plan. The conditions necessary to conduct the insurgency include a “vulnerable population, leadership available for direction, and lack of government control...[also] popular support, unity of effort, will to resist, leadership, discipline, intelligence, propaganda, favorable environment, and external support.”<sup>12</sup> Since the insurgent conflict is a war over the people, Al-Queda must separate the people from the government, and then replace the government with their own. The sequence of actions necessary to achieve that goal are: (1) remove outside influence and interference from the Western nations, especially the United States, (2) gain the active support of individual Muslims who are willing to give their lives for the cause, (3) make the government of Saudi Arabia illegitimate in the eyes of the populace, followed by Egypt, Iraq, and other Muslim governments, and (4) execute a coup to replace these governments under the control of a Caliph (see Illustration 1).



**Illustration 1: Al-Queda’s Strategy**

<sup>11</sup> Bard E. O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Brassey’s, Inc., Dulles, VA, 1990), 13.

<sup>12</sup> FM 90-8, Counterinsurgency Operations (Headquarters, Department of the Army, August 1986), 1-2 to 1-3.

Bin Laden views the enemy as the corrupt Muslim nation-state governments, beginning with Saudi Arabia. The Western nations are prime allies to these governments, not the main target. The strategies towards each are different. Al-Queda is pursuing a strategy of erosion against the Western nations in order to erode their will to remain influential in the area and diminish their ability to find support from the people of the region. Clausewitz understood the value of attacking an enemy's ally when he said, "...the acts we consider most important for the defeat of the enemy are the following: destruction of his army...seizure of his capital...delivery of an effective blow against his principal ally if that ally is more powerful than he."<sup>13</sup>

Following the American assault in Afghanistan, Bin Laden spoke "apocalyptically of the possibility of a war between Muslim and non-Muslim, of the suffering Iraqi people under sanctions and of the Palestinians in their conflict with Israel."<sup>14</sup> This was part of Al-Queda's efforts to expand their support base for themselves and against the United States. The reasons Osama bin Laden is angry at America were given in a 1998 manifesto that "denounced the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia, U.S. support for Israel, and sanctions against Iraq. To kill Americans and their allies, both civil and military, is an individual duty of every Muslim who is able, in any country... until their armies, shattered and broken-winged, depart from all the lands of Islam"<sup>15</sup> In a post-September 11 video, Osama bin Laden spelled out his goal to "trigger a chain of events which would eventually escalate to an all-out

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<sup>13</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, 720.

<sup>14</sup> Ahmed S. Hashim, 28.

<sup>15</sup> *Terrorism: Q&A: Terrorist Groups*, Council on Foreign Relations, [www.terrorismanswers.com/groups/binladen\\_print.html](http://www.terrorismanswers.com/groups/binladen_print.html).

confrontation between “Islam of true believers” and the “camp of the heretics.”<sup>16</sup> He desired the ability to interpret the GWOT as a Global War on Islam, to force Muslims to choose to follow the Islamists. While some Americans mistakenly perceived the attack as an attempt to “bring down the U.S. economy,” many understood that his intentions were to coerce the U.S. to leave the region. An ancient military theorist, Sun Tzu, stated that the “primary target is the mind of the opposing commander,” and that to “disrupt his alliances” is better than attacking his army.<sup>17</sup> Sun Tzu further emphasizes deception, patience, and choosing the initiative. Osama bin Laden’s attack was an attempt to

drive a decadent, casualty-averse United States out of the Middle East. Then he could overthrow those Muslim states, which had cooperated with Washington. His focus was on the seizure of territory and the establishment of regimes that could mobilize the much greater resources available to nation-states for the conduct of war. His objective was not to conquer New York, but his native Saudi Arabia from which he hoped to rule the Arab world.<sup>18</sup>

The ways to block United States involvement have adapted after the opening salvos in the GWOT. Al-Qaeda responded to the US-led multinational coalition by building its own multinational terrorist alliance in an attempt to synchronize global operations and intelligence. Propaganda efforts intensified through Arabic media to gain support from the people and elicit fear in the American people. Al-Qaeda has pursued weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and suicide bombing techniques, to raise the anxiety and pain threshold of Western nations. WMD have the greatest psychological impact on the target audience and maximum casualties at the least cost to the terrorist organization. Additionally, Al-Qaeda has urged terrorist allies to attack Americans on their own soil, to take the fight to them to destroy their will. Al-Qaeda anticipated U.S.

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<sup>16</sup> *War on Terrorism*, [www.psywarrior.com/terrorism.html](http://www.psywarrior.com/terrorism.html), 4.

<sup>17</sup> Samuel B. Griffith, *Sun Tzu: The Art of War* (Oxford University Press, London, 1963), 41 & 78.

efforts to provide humanitarian aid in conjunction with non-governmental organizations in order to build goodwill among the Islamic world. To counter this they have authorized targeting six categories of actors: “the United Nations; Muslim regimes that work with the West; multinational corporations; international communications and data exchange systems; international news agencies and satellite media channels; and international relief agencies.”<sup>19</sup> The open targeting of international actors such as CNN is surprising, given the benefit they gain in using this source for propaganda and information operations. However, it shows the distancing from “western puppets” in favor of Arabic media resources, such as Al-Jazeera. Al-Qaeda has further attempted to recruit Islamist political parties to shoulder the duties of propaganda, recruitment and fundraising, freeing Islamist terrorist groups to concentrate on planning, preparing and conducting attacks. Thus, until more favorable conditions emerge, Al-Qaeda will operate through mosques, madrassas, community centers, and, as best it can, charities in Western Europe and North America.<sup>20</sup>

Al-Qaeda is pursuing a strategy of annihilation against the Saudi government. They can be expected to label any Muslim nations involvement in a possible war with Iraq as treasonous to the faith. If the people do not have legitimate grievances against the Saudi government, Al-Qaeda will foster unrest and dissension. Any attempt to provoke governments to overreact and repress their own people will be a psychological victory for

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<sup>18</sup> William R. Hawkins, *Terrorism: Central Threat or Diversion?*, (Army magazine, Association of the United States Army, Washington, D.C., December 2002), 8.

<sup>19</sup> Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, *Confronting the West: Al-Qaeda's strategy after 11 September* (Jane's Intelligence Weekly, July 2002), 28.

<sup>20</sup> Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, 29.



the insurgent Al-Queda. The insurgent seeks

to erode the strength of the government through the use of terrorism or guerilla warfare, not only to increase the human and material cost to the government but also to demonstrate its failure to maintain effective control and provide protection for the people. Eventually, according to the insurgent's logic, the authorities will grow weary of the struggle and seek to prevent further losses by either capitulating or negotiating a settlement favorable to the insurgents....in the words of Mao Tse-tung, 'the richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people.'<sup>21</sup>

Terrorism remains Al-Queda's chosen way for the moment, designed to coerce governments to achieve political and religious objectives. The use of terrorism is a method to asymmetrically attack the weaknesses of the United States and Muslim nation-states, rather than attack their strengths. Terrorism uses violence directed primarily against non-combatants "carefully chosen in order to maximize their political impact...insurgent terrorism is purposeful, rather than mindless, violence because terrorist seek to achieve specific long-term, intermediate, and short-term goals."<sup>22</sup> The long-term goals are to change the political structures of the Islamic nations. The intermediate goal is to erode the psychological support and legitimacy of those governments. The short-term goals are to gain support, create dissension in the populace, provoke a repressive government response, and enhance credibility among people.

Al-Queda will try to gain support from the people through propaganda and active recruiting. They will try to get individual Muslims energized to use their faith to desire political change, which Al-Queda can provide. Meetings, cable news interviews and internet websites, protests, recruiting efforts, training young leaders and martyrs, providing assistance and services to the poor bring the local people into the problem and

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<sup>21</sup> Bard E. O'Neill, 70.

<sup>22</sup> Bard E. O'Neill, 24-25.

establish the insurgents as the answers. The importance of involving the local populace in the political change cannot be emphasized enough, and this is the main effort of the insurgent strategy.

A major advantage Al-Queda gains from remaining in Afghanistan is that the means [Muslims] for conducting their campaign of terror are fueled through the ideology that Islamists espouse in the region through madarassas in Pakistan, training and the media. While most Muslim clerics do not advocate this extremism, it does appeal to the poor, disillusioned, single young men of the region. Bin Laden's messages spark a chord with the youth who find a vent for their political frustrations in their personal and observed violence. These madrassas brainwash youth with Islamic fundamentalism and provide recruits for Al-Queda and the Taliban. "During the nineties, madrassas sprang up all over Pakistan. In 1997, in Punjab province alone, there were more than 200,000 students at the madrassas, which have supplied tens of thousands of recruits to the Taliban."<sup>23</sup>

Where the 1970's and 80's saw a predominance of nationalist terrorist groups, now nearly half of the known active international terrorist groups are religiously motivated. This increasing shift to use religion as a major thread of membership has many implications. The promise of future rewards, as opposed to earthly gains like political victory, can be extended indefinitely with none to return to verify the promised rewards. The merging of terrorist operational directions and guarantee of moral approval minimizes questions of the morality of the actions members are asked to perform. The

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<sup>23</sup> Peter L. Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden* (The Free Press, Simon & Schuster, Inc., New York, 2001), 149.

promise of heavenly rewards, peer approval and religious blessing are compelling reasons to participate. The current recruiting trends for terrorists are moving towards young people of both genders, and the impoverished and less educated.<sup>24</sup> Often, these youth have personal experience with violence in their life. In Saudi Arabia, Al-Queda recruits many young people by offering religious education in Pakistan or Afghanistan, where they are taught a militant version of Islam. “Theology seems to be more important than ideology as a means of recruitment because those who join insurgencies led by religious leaders already have some familiarity with the basic beliefs and behavioral norms of the faith.”<sup>25</sup> The young recruits are often emotional, committed to obedience, and eager to champion their cause.

From these zealous youth and frustrated adults, Al-Queda has created an umbrella organization for a growing number of global terrorist organizations. The Al-Queda organization “has a command and control structure, which includes a consultation council. The council has a military committee, a business committee, a religious committee, a media committee, and a travel office.”<sup>26</sup> The organization includes operational cells to conduct operations, intelligence cells to collect information and assist in planning, auxiliary cells for logistical support, and passive supporters. The cells that are close to the headquarters element endure frequent internal investigations to purge informants and operations are very decentralized for increased security. Numerous associates provide intelligence, money and equipment, as well as recruitment. Some

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<sup>24</sup> Cindy C. Combs, *Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century* (Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, 1997), 67-72.

<sup>25</sup> Bard E. O’Neill, 77.

<sup>26</sup> Yonay Alexander and Michael S. Swetnam, *Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaida: Profile of a Terrorist Network* (Transnational Publishers, Inc., New York, 2001), 3.

receive support through the Al-Queda network, as well. In addition, they have passive supporters in the region who

quietly sympathize with the insurgents but are unwilling to provide material assistance. Although at first glance passive supporters may seem inconsequential, that is not the case; at a minimum, they are not apt to betray or otherwise impede the insurgents, and this is important because a key aspect of counterinsurgency strategy for government units combating elusive terrorists and guerrillas is the acquisition of information from the people. Thus, passive support is a valuable commodity for insurgents.<sup>27</sup>

Al-Queda and Osama bin Laden have shown no indications of deserting Afghanistan; it provides many tactical advantages in defending against the GWOT. Advances in technology have made previous infrastructure requirements, such as facilities and communication assets, less important for the terrorist to survive and continue planning and executing attacks. “Al-Qaeda’s thinking was influenced by the withdrawal of US troops from three theaters: Beirut after the Hezbollah bombings in October 1983; Aden after the Al-Qaeda bombings in December 1992; and Somalia after the Al-Qaeda-trained Al-Ittihad attacks in October 1993. Bin Laden has said “...so we believe that the defeat of America is something achievable – with the permission of Allah – and it is easier for us...than the defeat of the Soviet empire previously.”<sup>28</sup>

Al-Queda has many strengths, to include global intelligence assets, indigenous characteristics, in depth knowledge of the culture and terrain, motivation based on an ideology willing to risk death, and the initiative to choose the time and place for the next attack. They have many trained operatives that can operate decentralized globally and are not tied to a nation-state’s boundaries. They have historical and current issues to exploit,

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<sup>27</sup> Bard E. O’Neill, 71.

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<sup>28</sup> Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, 29.

such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia and the region, and U.S. aggression against Iraq to unite the Muslim world against the U.S. “colonial” power. Their centers of gravity (COG), the sources of their strength and the focus of our attacks, are the leadership of Osama bin Laden and the support of the people.


Weaknesses include limited numbers of leaders, planners and resources; security requirements; a shortage of bases of operations and a coalition enemy. Their critical vulnerabilities (CVs) include their reliance on the Muslim populace, reliance on the media to get their message out, and the lack of support by a nation-state.

### ***Dau Tranh***

To better understand the ends, ways and means of Al-Queda, it is helpful to study the successful insurgency strategy used by the Vietnamese communists. This strategy was successful in “erasing the lines between military and civilian by ruling out the notion of noncombatants...All people became weapons of war – that is the meaning of the strategy – and all are expendable as any weapon is expendable in war.”<sup>29</sup> The strategy was named *Dau Tranh*, a highly emotional term which is Vietnamese for struggle (see Figure 2). *Dau Tranh* understood that “war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”<sup>30</sup> There were two elements of the strategy – a political element and an armed element – that were used together to achieve victory. Political *Dau Tranh* was considered the greater of the requirements, because it shaped the conditions for the success of both the Political *Dau Tranh* and the Armed *Dau Tranh* (see Illustration 2).

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<sup>29</sup> Douglas Pike, *PAVN: People’s Army of Vietnam, Chapter 9, Why the*



**Illustration 2: Vietnamese Dau Tranh Strategy<sup>31</sup>**

Armed dau tranh is the revolutionary violence program, that is military actions and other forms of bloodletting....political dau tranh means systematic coercive activity that involves motivation, social organization, communication of ideas, and mobilization of manpower and support....the revolutionary consciousness of the people has been gradually raised through use of the dau tranh strategy to the point where it explodes in a great human spontaneous combustion...the people rise up energized. The enemy's army shatters. The old society crumbles. The people seize power.<sup>32</sup>

The key to understanding the Dau Tranh strategy is defining “people as [the] instrument of war.” The mystique surrounding it involves the organization, mobilization, and motivation of people, all the people. The sequence of implementation is (1) control the people, (2) forge them into a weapon, then (3) hurl the weapon into battle.”<sup>33</sup> The sequence of actions required to forge the people into a weapon was the creation of

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*Communists Won: Military Dau Tranh* (Presidio Press, 1986), 260.

<sup>30</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, 99.

<sup>31</sup> Douglas Pike, 249.

<sup>32</sup> Douglas Pike, 261.

<sup>33</sup> Douglas Pike, 262.

organization, then the mobilization of those people toward the cause, and finally using the motivation that was created in the people as they saw the potential power they gained from mobilizing for a cause. All efforts were subordinated to this sequence and the people were only allowed to take action against grievances when the insurgent strategist decided that the whole team was ready for action. Political Dau Tranh was accomplished along three axes or “van” (Vietnamese for “action among”) programs. Dich Van (action among the enemy) was conducted among the people controlled by the enemy. These activities were conducted against the pro-South Vietnamese government supporters and the Americans back home and included propaganda, PSYOPs, rumor campaigns, lectures and meetings. The main method was not mass media; however, but a grass-roots level movement.

The basic device was the struggle movement, an immensely potent village-level method for denigrating the GVN and enlisting the support of antigovernment noncommunists. The struggle movement was of two types: (1) face-to-face struggle meeting (meeting for propaganda in depth), and (2) the coaxing struggle meeting (meeting for agitation in width)...purpose to raise the revolutionary consciousness of the individual villager...to destroy local social patterns and to break existing social relationships...for communicating a sense of social solidarity...building of confidence...to demonstrate to the individual Vietnamese participant the power that lay in organized mass action.<sup>34</sup>

This method works best in a democracy, where the freedom of speech allows such interactions. Rather than fight the “unliberated” people, the insurgent tries to side with the poor, deceived people, by enlightening them to the corruption and injustice in their

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<sup>34</sup> Douglass Pike, 270.



government leaders. The will of the American people was their COG and the Vietnamese systematically attacked CVs through the media, visiting actors, and PSYOPs against the soldiers.

The second Political Dau Tranh was called Binh Van (action among the military) and it involved efforts to recruit the South Vietnamese soldiers and civil servants. Its goal was to demoralize them to induce desertion or at least poor performance of their duties. The third method was called Dan Van (action among the people). This was used against the “liberated areas” already under communist control.

Basically, this consisted of the administrative and motivational activity of the liberated, or safe-haven area, that portion of the country under more or less day-to-day communist control.... The objectives of the dan van program were threefold: (1) organizational, throwing a net of organizations over the villager, enmeshing him in the system; also to oppose, frustrate, and nullify the various internal security measures taken by the GVN and the efforts of its agents to penetrate the liberated area; (2) recruitment...(3) financial, raising of funds through taxes...<sup>35</sup>

Again, the key to understanding the Dau Tranh strategy is the concept that the people are the battlefield, not the terrain and that the political element was conducted simultaneously with the armed element. Recruiting, organizing, and involving the people were the main efforts in their strategy.

The armed Dau Tranh involved a regular force strategy, using the conventional North Vietnamese Army (NVA), and a protracted conflict strategy, using guerilla forces, such as the Viet Cong (VC). The NVA only conducted limited attacks until their forces grew large enough to make larger scale attacks against the conventional American forces. The commander, General Giap, needed methods to bypass American mass and mobility.

He accomplished this by using two armed Dau Tranh tactics simultaneously: the medium-sized “coordinated fighting method” attack against a target chosen for its psychological value on the enemy, and the “gnat-swarm technique” that involved “mounting dozens of daily small-scale actions, no single one being important but cumulatively raising the enemy’s anxiety level and destroying his self-confidence.”<sup>36</sup> As the forces grew, psychological targets were chosen with the intent of breaking the will of the enemy, not the enemy forces.

### *Counterinsurgency Principles*

Dau Tranh helps us to understand the strategies behind Al-Queda. With defeat came much reflection, and the United States returned to the classical theorists to develop new doctrine to defeat insurgencies in the future. America returned to the foundation of determining the character and nature of war. Karl von Clausewitz said “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will...force...is thus the means of war; to impose our will on the enemy is its object. To secure that object we must render the enemy powerless; and that, in theory, is the true aim of warfare.”<sup>37</sup> In the Vietnam War, America lost sight of the political nature of war, and the ability of the communists to impose their will on us. Thus, we were able to “win the battle, but lose the war.” Clausewitz further described how the enemy gains his strength and will to fight from three elements: “the people, the commander and his army, and the government [enemy’s

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<sup>35</sup> Douglass Pike, 274-5.

<sup>36</sup> Douglas Pike, 265.

<sup>37</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, 83.

will or leadership].”<sup>38</sup> Al-Queda and the Interim Afghanistan government need these elements and the war is over the control of them. A successful Counter-Insurgency Operation (COIN) addresses all three of these elements in the planning.

Another concept that was rediscovered was the ‘Center of Gravity’ or COG. As the source of all power and movement on which everything depends, it varies based on the character of the conflict and the opposing forces. It is found at strategic and operational levels and more than one COG may exist at the operational level. ”At the strategic level, the range of possible centers of gravity is broad. The enemy’s fighting forces...a particular population center, a region providing manpower, or a capital city...public support.”<sup>39</sup> It can also be said that “the strategic center of gravity is most often some controlling aspect of the nation, state, alliance, coalition, or group...for example... economic control... center of communications and control...will of the people... dominant partner...political leaders...clan leaders...national capital...religious leaders.”<sup>40</sup> The operational COG is most often described as some dominant element of the enemy armed force. America’s strategic COG remains the will of its people and its operational-level COGs include our fighting forces and technological advantages. The Viet Cong guerilla’s strategic COG was its alliance with communist North Vietnam and its operational COGs included Viet Cong battalions and guerrillas with popular support and a deployed, ideologically motivated, political leadership. Al-Queda’s strategic COG may be its alliances with other terrorist organizations and with sponsoring nations and its operational COGs include Islam as an enabler to build popular support, the media and


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<sup>38</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, 102.

<sup>39</sup> MCDP 1-1, 86.

religiously motivated operators and leadership, especially Osama bin Laden. To defeat the enemy, his COGs must be defeated.

The key to reaching his COG is to determine and attack his “Critical Capabilities” or CCs and “Critical Vulnerabilities” or CVs. CCs are those elements that enable the COG to maintain its strength. CVs provide focus for our efforts and are the key to reaching the COG. Attacking enemy CVs also protects our forces by avoiding the enemy strengths. “To be critical, a vulnerability must meet two criteria: First, the capture, destruction, or exploitation of this vulnerability must significantly undermine or destroy a center of gravity. Second, the critical vulnerability must be something that we have the means to capture, destroy, or exploit.”<sup>41</sup> A successful strategy attacks CVs, finds gaps in CCs and defeats the COG. (see Illustration 3).



**Illustration 3: Counter-insurgency Strategy**

<sup>40</sup> MAJ Phillip Kevin Giles and CPT Thomas P. Galvin, *Center of Gravity: Determination, Analysis, and Application* (Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013, January 31, 1996), 10-12.

<sup>41</sup> MCDP 1-1, *Strategy* (Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 12 November 1997), 87.

Successful COIN missions look for enemy COGs, CCs and CVs, protect friendly COGs, CCs and CVs, and address the interactions between the government/insurgent leadership, people, and army/guerrillas or terrorists. The population is the key terrain in COIN operations and must be controlled or defended. The government must separate the insurgents from the people and destroy the insurgent movement. Concurrently, the government must address valid grievances and take step towards long-term reforms to defeat the sources of the insurgency. Winning the COIN requires two criteria: “first is security...for individuals and security for the government...second is a viable government...capable of producing results; one which is capable of implementing the programs necessary for the political and economic development of the country.”<sup>42</sup> A COIN strategy is based on “the concept of balanced development, mobilization, and neutralization....[the] military assists the COIN program through the conduct of six major operations: intelligence, psychological operations, civil affairs, populace and resources control, advisory assistance, and tactical operations.”<sup>43</sup> Supporting armies should try to help the host nation (HN) government strengthen their legitimacy in the eyes of its people. The internal actions that a government takes to conduct COIN operations are part of their Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) campaign. The IDAD

program blends four interdependent functions to prevent or eliminate insurgency: balanced development using political, social and economic programs; security to protect the populace from the insurgency and to provide a safe environment for national development, neutralization to physically and psychologically separate

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<sup>42</sup> James Farmer, *Counterinsurgency: Principles and practices in Viet-nam* (The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 1964), 2.

<sup>43</sup> FM 90-8, *Counterinsurrection Operations* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., August 1986), 1-4 to 1-5.

the insurgents from the population, and mobilization to organize manpower (including popular support) and materiel resources.<sup>44</sup>

Efforts by an outside nation to assist another nation conduct IDAD is called Foreign Internal Defense (FID).

IDAD uses police, intelligence, psychological operations (PSYOPs), population and resource control, civic actions, and tactical military operations. It requires political development, economic development and social development (health, education, land reforms, housing, etc.) to instill hope and create genuine long-term change that addresses the source issues of conflict. It is also important to instill a sense of participation from locals in solving their own problem with some assistance. This creates ownership of the problem, pride in the accomplishments, and self-sustainability after the U.S. departs.

Eliminating the threat requires a two-pronged approach: combat operations against Al-Queda and Civic Assistance to secure the support of the populace and begin the long-term improvements that the government must make, with the assistance of NGOs, IGOs, PVOs and other governments. The Civil Affairs (CA) role in FID is to aid the government conduct this liaison with outside organizations or civic assistance, and civic action programs to focus on the immediate needs of the population. One method to build unity of effort and conduct the necessary liaison with outside agencies is the Civil Military Operations Center. U.S. Army Civil Affairs personnel are ideally suited and trained to establish a CMOC. In previous operations, the CMOC proved its value time and again.

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<sup>44</sup> FM 100-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict* (Headquarters, Departments of the Army and the Air Force, 1990), 2-8.

In a COIN, the civic action usually requires Humanitarian Assistance (HA) and Population and Resources Control (PRC) missions. HA operations “relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation in countries or regions outside the United States.”<sup>45</sup> They are generally limited in scope and duration and intended to supplement HN government efforts to provide assistance. Population and Resource Control (PRC) have a “primary goal to separate the population from the insurgents and deprive them of support. A secondary goal is to protect the population from insurgent exploitation and domination. The central theme is population protection and resource management. Restrictive measures are kept to a minimum to prevent popular discontent.”<sup>46</sup> PRC measures should avoid alienating the civilian populace, and PRC measures such as credentials, curfews, suspension of civil rights, evacuation, or relocation are kept to the minimum. PRC also include efforts to support friendly military operations by keeping civilians away and protecting civilians and their property from friendly military operations. Other Civil-Military Operations (CMO) are shown below.

<b>CMO Activities</b>	<b>Focus Group</b>	<b>Purpose</b>
PRC	HN Population & US Military	Separate HN population & resources from military engagements
HA	HN Population	Short-term quality of life improvements
ES	HN Population	Provide emergency services
FNS	US Military	Provide logistical support to Military Cdr
MCA	HN Military	Help HN Military build legitimacy
Spt to Civ Admin	HN Government	Improve HN Infrastructure

<sup>45</sup> Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., 16 June 1995), III-5.

<sup>46</sup> FMFM 8-2, *Counterinsurgency Operations* (U.S. Marine Corps, Quantico, VA, 1980), para. 615.b., pg 53.

PSYOP forces aid CA forces by using information to “discredit the insurgent, to explain the U.S. presence, to gain popular support for the host government, and to reduce civilian casualties from military operations.”<sup>47</sup> PSYOPs match “words” to the “deeds” that CA provides. PSYOP objectives include isolating insurgents from the population, achieve withdrawal of support for the insurgent, build loyalty and support for the government, friendly neutrality or active support and non-involvement in supporting the insurgency.<sup>48</sup> When a terrorist act has been committed PSYOPs aid by lessening popular support for the terrorist cause, persuading terrorists that they cannot achieve their goals, and promoting legitimacy for the government.<sup>49</sup>

In all COIN operations, the Principles of MOOTW (Military Operations Other Than War), apply:

(1) direct every military operation towards a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective, (2) Unity of effort in every operation ensures all means are directed to a common purpose, (3) Security is always important and depends on never permitting hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage, (4) MOOTW may require restraint in order to apply appropriate military capabilities prudently, (5) Perseverance allows for measured, protracted application of military capabilities in support of strategic aims, (6) Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and the host government, where applicable.<sup>50</sup>

While CMO are critical to the success of COIN operations, the government must take an active role in solving the long-term issues that create the sources of insurgency. In this regional insurgency, the United States must also take an active role in aiding Muslim countries by developmental aid, technology, and educational assistance to prevent the

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<sup>47</sup> FMFM 8-2, para. 610.b, pg 44.

<sup>48</sup> FM 90-8, H-9 to H-10.

<sup>49</sup> FM 3-05.30 (FM 33-1), *Psychological Operations* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 2000), 4-15.

<sup>50</sup> Joint Pub 3-07, viii.



characterization of a “clash of civilizations” and the United States must begin to win the Information Operations battle to sell the American truth to an uninformed population.

***CMO Case Studies: The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960***

The wise strategist studies history to find solutions to modern problems, lest he re-invent the wheel. The first successful large-scale counter-insurgency occurred in the island nation of Malaya in 1948. Malaya was made up of three ethnic groups: indigenous Malays, Indian immigrants, and Chinese immigrants. The Chinese had the most active resistance against the Japanese during World War II and formed the core of the communist insurgents after the war. When the British returned to Malaya after the war, the communists decided to work within the political system. The British plan for democratization and treating Singapore as a separate issue met strong resistance from groups fearful of losing power. The British were not eager to leave their Malayan rubber and tin resources and the opposition groups grew increasingly impatient for independence. The tensions escalated in 1948, when Chinese communists resorted to guerrilla warfare from jungle bases.

The British called the crisis the Malayan Emergency, and with the help of 100,000 Malay police, the 10,000 British and Commonwealth forces defeated the roughly 6,000 guerrillas. The Chinese communists, a minority on Malaya, never gained the popular support they needed to win. They also never gained support from world opinion and never gained a base outside of Malaya. This forced them to remain in the jungle, away from sources of food and people. Defeating the insurgents was very challenging, though. Both the British and the insurgents conducted campaigns of annihilation. The British strategic aim was to leave Malaya with a stable, non-communist government. The

communist strategic aim was to be in a powerful position, militarily and politically, so they could seize power after the British departed. The British identified the enemy COG as the poor Chinese minority that provided the bulk of their recruits. Their CVs were their isolation from the Malay-dominated country and their dependence on food from the Chinese farmers. The British COG was the strong Malaysian government who had a legitimate claim to rule and promised a better future for the people than the communists could offer. The British conducted ambushes in the jungles to destroy guerrilla opposition. They also realized early on the need to win the hearts and minds of the populace. The Briggs Plan was the first step and they conducted PRC through resettling half a million Chinese peasants that were a source of food and soldiers for the insurgents, and by providing security with police in populated areas. Rules of engagement were very strict and people were given economic means to build homes, own titles to property and rights of citizenship. The Malays were easy to win over, but the Chinese took longer, fearing that they would be “second-class” citizens if they joined the government.

The active participation of the populace in the campaign was encouraged by the establishment of a Home Guard, by recruiting for the police, and by constant exhortation. At first only the Malays responded...the Chinese sat on the fence until it was evident, first, that the insurgents were not likely to win, and, second, that support of the government would be in Chinese interests.<sup>51</sup>

Another policy to improve the peoples' conditions was “Operation Service,” which involved social measures in the new villages. PSYOPs won the support of the uncommitted Chinese and decreased support to the insurgents. These coordinated IDAD were extremely effective. Key to success was the close civil-military-police-intelligence teamwork and bringing the populace, Malay and Chinese, in to participate in developing

and implementing solutions to the problems. This helped to not only defeat the insurgency, but also to prepare for the formation of a new government. The communists kept up the resistance for over a decade, but by 1952 the main threat had passed.

After long negotiations, independence was granted to the Federation of Malaya, as a Commonwealth, in 1957. The transfer of power was peaceful and the British were esteemed for their skills in defeating the guerillas and negotiating.

The British departed voluntarily, with the respect and friendship of the founders of the nation, leaving a Malaya, moreover, from which the menace of communist violence had been virtually eradicated. Britain's greatest imperial achievement, perhaps, was not the acquisition of her worldwide empire, but the manner in which she gave it up.<sup>52</sup>

### ***US Marine Corps Combined Action Program, Vietnam, 1965-1971***

Vietnam was an incredibly complex conflict for the United States to understand. America was not prepared to face an enemy that was indistinguishable from the civilian population, nor the presence of 3 types of enemy forces: conventional North Vietnamese Army (NVA) soldiers, Viet Cong (VC) guerillas, and the VC infrastructure living in the villages. The political and psychological dimensions were inconceivable to a nation trained primarily to fight a symmetric war. The use of political meetings, protests, and propaganda were tools left to politicians, not warriors. Additionally, the mountain and jungle environment was harsh and aided the guerilla fighters and the supply lines.

To counter this, General [Lewis W. Walt [CG, III Marine Amphibious Force],

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<sup>51</sup> *Guerilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan*, Ed. Gerard Chaliand (University of California Press, Berkeley, California, 1982), 272.

<sup>52</sup> J.A.S. Grenville, *A History of the World in the Twentieth Century* (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1994), 400-401.

backed by General Krulak's [CG, Fleet Marine Forces Pacific] call for "clear and hold" operations, devised a three-pronged strategy: to seek out and destroy the NVA and VC main force units; to conduct aggressive small unit operations to root out the local VC; and to provide a continual security shield behind which the GVN could rebuild. But this last element was the critical factor – "As the relatively secure areas kept growing, we needed more and more troops, naturally, to keep the areas secure."<sup>53</sup>

The Marines needed to cover more ground with fewer troops to advance their control beyond the base camps. "The Marines recognized the close interrelationship between defense of the base area and the extension of Marine influence into the countryside."<sup>54</sup> Thus was born the Combined Action Program, or CAP, one of the Marine Corps success stories.

It is important to realize that the Marine Corps had prior experience in low-intensity conflicts. Prior to World War II, they engaged in approximately thirty actions of this type. "Many of the techniques utilized by the Combined Action Platoons, which were part of Combined Action Program, had their grounding in the "small wars" of the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Haiti circa 1912-1932."<sup>55</sup> Realizing the importance of involvement with the civilian population, the CAP Marines created integrated village and hamlet-level defense units from regular Marines and Popular Forces (PF), similar to a village militia. Operations were conducted for the benefit and protection of the village and led by village leaders. In 1962, Secretary of Defense McNamara stated, "These may be the most important military people in Vietnam. They

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<sup>53</sup> Bruce C. Allnutt, *Marine Combined Action Capabilities: The Vietnam Experience*, (Human Science Research, Inc., McLean, VA, December 1969), 7-8.

<sup>54</sup> Major Charles W. Driest, *Combined Action Platoons: A Possible Role in the Low-Intensity Conflict Environment* (School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1990), 7.

<sup>55</sup> Major Charles W. Driest, 3.

have something real to fight for – their own hamlet, their own family.”<sup>56</sup> CAP was key to gaining influence into Vietnamese life and tactical intelligence from a grass-roots level.

The overall goal of the CAP program shifted from controlling more area with fewer Marines, to pacification of rural Vietnam. Within each CAP unit operating at a village or hamlet-level, the missions were two-fold: provide security by integrating with the PFs to form local militias; and improve the villagers’ ability to sustain and defend themselves by creating involvement in projects to better themselves and to help them identify with their village and the national government. This stood in stark contrast to the VietCong whose Dau Tranh tried to mobilize the people to action for the “greater” cause to use them to destroy the government. CAP tried to mobilize the people to solve their own problems and reinforce the government infrastructure. The main tasks associated with the CAP units were integrated US/PF security, intelligence gathering, civic action and PSYOPs.

When a CAP team began to work in a village, their first task was to get integrated into the village...to be accepted by the villagers, and to earn the right to help and be heard. It was important that the villagers knew that the Marines did not want to use them and genuinely cared for the well-being. As one young Marine said:

...We were first and foremost to become deeply involved, on a personal basis, with the Vietnamese people; helping them throughout their daily lives in whatever small way we could. We were to help the sick to heal, the starving to survive, those in fear to be comforted and the orphaned to find a home. We were to teach the farmers how to improve their farming methods in simple ways. Basic tools were brought in to decrease their workload, while at the same time enhancing our purpose and communicating our friendly intentions to everyone. The Vietnamese were very proud people with many ideas and beliefs which created an invisible and, in some case an impenetrable, barrier. Yet if you approached them with

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<sup>56</sup> Major Charles W. Driest, 4.

sincerity, with your heart on your sleeve and with a desire to “become one of them,” they would accept you, follow you and learn from you. As long as you were willing to accept and become involved in every phase of their life and do, say, eat and drink everything as they did, your mission would succeed and, most of all, you would survive.<sup>57</sup>

The deep involvement in village life lent itself to willingness on the part of the villagers to provide intelligence information on VC and VCI living in the village. This invaluable information would never have been attained if the Marines merely visited the villages enroute to combat operations. Their integration and willingness to give their life to help people, opened the doors for greater information.

Once they gained acceptance, their second responsibility was to train new warriors in the village, some as young as fourteen years old. These men realized the danger that threatened their families and friends and they performed quite well. The majority of small unit actions were raids and ambushes and the Marine squad leader, upon whom the entire program depended, was well prepared to instruct these basic combat skills. The majority of his time was devoted to training, planning, conducting these patrols.

The Civic Action projects were divided into three categories: giveaways, major projects and small projects. The giveaways consisted of providing small, free items to the villagers, such as toys, toiletries, food, seed, school supplies, etc. These were supposed to be given through the village chief, to reinforce his legitimacy, but the Marines often gave them out directly. This was often due to corruption in the village leadership. Giveaways met with mixed reactions from the Marines and the villagers, since these items were given in a “welfare” manner. Major projects included

construction of “schools, dispensaries, dwellings, pagodas, bridges, dams, marketplaces, fences, wells, latrines, and so on.”<sup>58</sup> The villagers were supposed to decide on the projects that would best benefit them, but, unfortunately, the Vietnamese were often timid and slow, so the Marines chose and completed the projects for them. Adding to the dilemma was a lack of trust in the Vietnamese government supply system. The system was very slow and the Marines sometimes found the supplies through other “creative” methods. This lack of involvement with the villagers and government did not always create the desired sense of “ownership.” The third category was the small project, designed as a short-term, high impact, low cost project. It included such things as “medical civic action programs (MEDCAP), village cleanups, teaching kids to swim (and take a bath), encouraging athletics, forming “boy scouts,” and convincing the people to raise rabbits or plant an extra vegetable crop out of the traditional season...”<sup>59</sup> While these were not easily evaluated for effectiveness, they were considered inexpensive enough to continue and to help give the Marines an opportunity to “do something good” to help out.

Some Marines tried to improve the methods of the CAP through social experimentation. LtCol William R. Corson, commander of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Tank Battalion, tried one such experiment at Phong Bac. He approached the efforts in a very rational, task-oriented manner. He wanted to leave the decision-making largely up to the Vietnamese at the hamlet-level. He wanted to avoid the cardinal sin of “doing development to

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<sup>57</sup> Barry L. Goodson, *Cap Mot: The Story of a Marine Special Forces Unit in Vietnam, 1968-1969* (University of North Texas Press, Denton, TX, 1997), viii-ix.

<sup>58</sup> Bruce C. Allnutt, 45-47.

<sup>59</sup> Bruce C. Allnutt, 47.

people.”<sup>60</sup> The Marines first worked on entry into the village to gain their trust. Then they tried to identify with the villagers, but not in the usual methods. Rather than use

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<sup>60</sup> Michael E. Peterson, *The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines' Other War in Vietnam* (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1989), 107.



meetings and handouts, they appealed to the villagers' desire to make money. This was truly capitalism at the grass-roots level. They followed a set sequence that was very subtle in its approach. The Marines created a community chest of money with a one-time sale of fish that the Marines caught using demolitions. Once they had this seed money, the Marines would make occasional contributions to the pot. During any transactions with the Vietnamese, the Marines bought and sold items, even a very low cost, to maintain the dignity and independence of the people. The villagers were encouraged to save towards a goal and the progress was charted to show progress and to generate hope.

The Vietnamese were given a sense of control over basic capital accumulation and savings for investment through the Red Feather concept. In the hamlet, savings progress was charted on a billboard depicting a ladder that led to a heavenly Buddhist temple. The billboard kept all the hamlet residents apprised of the exact amount of money saved and kept the officials honest.<sup>61</sup>

This is a technique reminiscent of the Combined Federal Campaign thermometers found outside many military installations today. As the money pot grew, a council was formed to decide what to do with the proceeds.

The first choice was a pig-breeding farm, followed by other market-oriented agricultural projects...as the money-making power of the pig breeding effort increased, agricultural specialization and diversification spread. The economic monopolies engendered by the rice monoculture were broken. Land and other rental prices declined, further fueling the economy. One year later, Corson noted "a drive-in and walk-in movie...numerous new shops, ranging from a cobbler to a blacksmith, two new schools build by the people with teachers paid for by the people, an active self-run dispensary, and a hamlet self-defense force."<sup>62</sup>

CAP's success in so many areas demonstrates how the dual roles of the CAPs as

defenders and builders – tie in to one another, and how the processes, once started, reinforce themselves through feedback and become continuing cycles. Once visible progress has been made, the CAP becomes more willing to help, and

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<sup>61</sup> Michael E. Peterson, 108.

<sup>62</sup> Michael E. Peterson, 108.

the people, having a larger stake in the future, become more willing to defend it against aggression from any quarter.<sup>63</sup>

As the social and economic progress began, the vulnerability of the villagers to insurgent propaganda decreased as well.

The CAP program provided many lessons for future COIN operations. While the Marines were superb at training and leading patrols to provide local security, they were not as skilled in the civic action and PSYOPs roles. Much of this is due to lack of specialized training for the Marines. All Marines were not as astute as LtCol Corson. Additionally, the nature of the conflict reduced measurements of effectiveness to meeting statistical quotas for numbers of handouts or schools built. They could have provided greater services if they functioned as liaisons to larger, professional units, such as Civil Affairs or Psychological Operations units. Links to State Department and Non-governmental organizations would have brought greater “combat” power to bear on the humanitarian issues the villagers faced. Three things that most hindered the success of the CAPs were “cultural differences, language barriers, and training.”<sup>64</sup> Many learned enough of the language to get the job done, but this slowed their effectiveness and possibly created problems that could have been avoided if they had more cultural awareness prior to arriving in villages. The time required to develop these skills builds a “credible argument that a CAP type mission should be performed by a specific type unit vice a general combat type unit.”<sup>65</sup>

Though the CAP program was a great success in breaking the connection between

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<sup>63</sup> Bruce C. Allnutt, 53.

<sup>64</sup> Major Charles W. Driest, 22.

<sup>65</sup> Major Charles W. Driest, 24.

the VC guerilla and the villagers, the Marine Corps had to draw it down in late 1969, along with regular line units, due to manpower ceilings. They fought well and many found it as difficult to leave Vietnam as it would have been to leave family behind. “They left behind Vietnamese who were not faceless peasants, but rather individuals: colleagues, friends, and even families.”<sup>66</sup> Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak strongly supported CAPs and highlighted two important statistics as evidence of their success: “no village protected by a combined action unit was ever repossessed by the VietCong; and 60% of the Marines serving in the combined action units volunteered to stay on with their Marines and Vietnamese companions for an additional six months when they could have returned to the United States.”<sup>67</sup>

### ***Operation Home Depot, Afghanistan, 2002***

The attacks by Al-Queda terrorists on 11 September 2001 ushered in a new counter-insurgency campaign for the United States. President Bush reiterated the simple desire of people for peace and freedom.

People everywhere want to be able to speak freely; choose who will govern them; worship as they please; educate their children – male and female; own property; and enjoy the benefits of their labor. These values of freedom are right and true for every person, in every society – and the duty of protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Michael E. Peterson, 85.

<sup>67</sup> Major Charles W. Driest, 19-20.

<sup>68</sup> *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (The White House, Washington, D.C., September 2002), iii.

He also emphasized the responsibility of the United States to protect peace and freedoms from international terrorists by disrupting and destroying terrorist networks and support bases, removing the underlying causes of terrorism, winning the war of ideas, and kindling hope and aspirations of freedom.<sup>69</sup> The retribution came quickly as combat operations began on 7 October 2001 in Afghanistan to defeat Al-Queda, their Taliban hosts, and to begin the long journey of removing the roots of international terrorism and helping “unleash the productive potential of individuals in all nations.”<sup>70</sup>

In every war, there are untold stories about missions and activities that were classified or overshadowed by more exciting operations. The public thirst for visible scenes of retribution takes preeminence in the media. On 2 March 2002, the largest ground combat operation since Operation Desert Storm was conducted in the remote mountains of Afghanistan. Dubbed Operation Anaconda, over a thousand coalition forces were inserted into the region to defeat up to a thousand Taliban military forces and Al-Queda terrorists. The Operation was concluded within three weeks and the enemy fighters and supply bases were destroyed or forced to flee.

Unbeknownst to many, however, was a quieter, less publicized operation. This action was conducted concurrently with Operation Anaconda, but was critical to securing the victory and freedom for the Afghan people against the repressive Taliban regime and cancerous Al-Queda terrorists. The operation was called Operation Home Depot, and it involved a small group of civil affairs soldiers who roofed homes in Gardeyz, Afghanistan. While the scope of the operation pales in comparison to Anaconda, it is an example of the type of activities that will be required to ensure a victory for the free

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<sup>69</sup> The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 6.

world in the Global War on Terrorism. By severing the support base the terrorists enjoy, Humanitarian assistance missions, such as Operation Home Depot, are the most effective activities that Civil Affairs units can conduct to effectively secure the victory in this war.

The U.S. Army Civil Affairs units were assigned to the Central Command as part of the Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task-Force (CJCMOTF). See below.




Illustration 4: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Task Organization

The CJCMOTF conducted humanitarian assistance missions during OEF and ensuring good relations between coalition partners and the Afghans. Formed in

<sup>70</sup> The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 21.

December 2001, the CJCMOTF set up thirteen Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLCs, pronounced “Chicklets”) to aid in making assessments and managing regional projects and issues. Co-located with CA soldiers in the CHLCs were Special Forces A-teams, PSYOP troops, and USAID officials. The CJCMOTF conducted short-term, quick-fix projects to quickly gain the support of the Afghans and liaisons with the State Department and NGOs/IGOs to synchronize long-term developmental projects. Their first priority was assisting the U.S. military commanders in maintaining their freedom of action for combat operations by reducing the civilian presence and impact. Their second priority was to lessen the damage of the military on the civilians. Civil Affairs soldiers have unique cultural and linguistic skills, and many civilian-acquired skills, necessary to achieve their missions and they are specially trained for special operations of this nature. They also assist commanders by securing resources from the local populace that benefit military missions, such as lumber, generators or translators. They bring unique training for CMO (Military Civic Action; Emergency Services; Population and Resources Control, which includes Dislocated Civilian Operations and Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations; Humanitarian Assistance; and Foreign Nation Support) and Support to Civil Administrations. CA units are organized around four functional areas (government, public facilities, economic, and special functions) and often bring parallel civilian skills into their military jobs.

CA units conducted numerous HA missions in Afghanistan: repairing roads, hospitals and research facilities; conducting well-drilling projects; buying generators to restore power at the Mazer-e-Sharif airport; and repairing and opening the Freedom Bridge between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, which “enabled even larger amounts of

humanitarian relief to enter the country.”<sup>71</sup> CA units also reopened schools, like the Cheheltan School in Kabul, to provide humanitarian assistance and ensure good relations. Their efforts will provide future generations of leaders, engineers, doctors and teachers who will bring lasting change to Afghanistan. They also supported the transitional government of Afghanistan in their most important projects, including building the Teachers Training College, the Artificial Insemination Farm, and the restoration of the Kabul Dental Hospital.<sup>72</sup> One CA soldier noted that

we are actually winning the hearts and minds of the people of Afghanistan...[he] believes that in about 10 to 15 years, the young people will be adults and they will be making decisions that will affect their country...I get great satisfaction knowing what we are doing makes a difference in the minds of young people.<sup>73</sup>

The 401<sup>st</sup> CA Battalion soldiers have partnered with regular forces, from HHC, 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division, to extend goodwill to the Afghans as well. 25 airborne soldiers volunteered for an HA program, named Adopt-a-Village, that links the soldiers up with a village in need of manual labor, and the communities in the United States that provide the resources to complete their tasks. One soldier wrote, “once I emailed my friends back home, the project took a life of its own...Boy Scout troops, churches and local business got together and started sending items over here.”<sup>74</sup> Interaction like this is great for proving the goodwill of the American military and public to protect and provide for the victims of terrorism and oppression, and for educating and training conventional soldiers

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<sup>71</sup> Lt. Gen Bryan (Doug) Brown, Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, *U.S. Army Special Operations: Fighting and Supporting The Global War on Terrorism* (Army 2002-03 Green Book, Association of the United States Army (AUSA), Arlington, VA, October 2002), 185.

<sup>72</sup> Sergeant Robb Huhn, *CJCMOTF Helps Impact a Nation*, [www.centcom.mil/News/Stories/Operation%20Enduring%20Freedom/08\\_02/08\\_07\\_02b.htm](http://www.centcom.mil/News/Stories/Operation%20Enduring%20Freedom/08_02/08_07_02b.htm).

<sup>73</sup> Sergeant Zelda Thomas-Gates, *CHLC (Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cell) Officer Helps Rebuild Afghanistan*, [www.centcom.mil/News/Stories/Operation%20Enduring%20Freedom/10\\_02/10\\_02\\_07.htm](http://www.centcom.mil/News/Stories/Operation%20Enduring%20Freedom/10_02/10_02_07.htm).

<sup>74</sup> Specialist Joe Healy, *Bagram Soldiers Adopt-A-Village in Afghanistan*, [www.centcom.mil/News/Stories/Operation%20Enduring%20Freedom/11\\_02/11\\_07\\_4.htm](http://www.centcom.mil/News/Stories/Operation%20Enduring%20Freedom/11_02/11_07_4.htm).

in cultural awareness and civilian sensitivities. Two CA operators, Captain Steve McAlpin and Sergeant First Class Juan Morales, expressed how they help bridge the gap between the U.S. and Coalition forces and the Afghans. They have been able to develop a special trust, that is evident through their hugs and hand-holding with Afghan generals and colonels, a symbol of their acceptance in a world where a man's word means more than rank. McAlpin said, "it's the relationship that counts...if you appeal to a person's honor here, it's like butter on your bread. It's genuine. It's from the heart."<sup>75</sup> The team regularly visits villages and dines with local officials. They help the military avoid cultural pitfalls and resolve problems. McAlpin said. "People say we're the buffers...we're the mediators."<sup>76</sup> When CA personnel created "beltways of goodwill" with efforts like this, it not only increased the flow of useful intelligence, but also helped protect conventional forces from snipers and insurgents who try to kill coalition forces, as the civilians provided information and protected the soldiers from harm.

This cultural awareness is paramount to success in a world that is very different from anything many of these soldiers have ever seen. Special Forces (SF) soldiers are regionally aligned, like CA forces, and also train in languages and culture of the region. In one instance, SF soldiers conducted searches of homes in the Shahikot Valley. They were very polite and allowed one Afghan man to hide his women relatives before the SF men entered his home. After serving tea and conducting the search, the SF men bid him farewell, and moved to the next home to conduct their search. They noticed a team of young paratroopers from the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division searching the same home after them,

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<sup>75</sup> Linda D. Kozaryn, *Civil Affairs Team Bridges Two Worlds* (American Forces Press Service, 30 May 2002, <http://www.civilaffairsassoc.org/Headlines.htm>.)

<sup>76</sup> Linda D. Kozaryn.



but in a different manner. The soldiers kicked in the door and attempted to frisk the women. The man was completely dishonored and his women were in tears before the SF could stop the search. The difference in mindset between the SF soldiers and conventional forces was the difference. SF and CA soldiers know the value of building relationships and kindness in a counter-insurgency, where the paratroops are trained to conduct combat operations without the same regard for civilians on the battlefield. The paratroopers ruined the rapport the SF had worked hard to build in the local villages and their actions

probably set back their counterinsurgency and intelligence operations by at least six months....the stream of friendly intelligence on weapon caches, mines and terrorist activities...dried up...if you establish rapport with the people – establish you are not an occupying army – and prove you are here to support the transitional government, they will tell you where to find Al-Queda.<sup>77</sup>

The CA planners for Operation Home Depot determined that the Civil Center of Gravity, the element of Afghan society that would have a constructive cascading effect when engaged, was the tribal leaders or warlords. As such, they sought to channel their efforts through these authorities and build relationships with these key individuals. The Critical Vulnerabilities were repressed women, medical deprivation, the lack of civil liberties, and severe drought. The people had basic survival needs. This is a country where one in four Afghan children die before reaching the age of five and an estimated 10,000 land mines are present resulting in numerous amputees. CA forces air dropped an estimated seven million humanitarian daily rations (HDRs) and aided numerous world food agencies during the campaign. Over 83 wells have been dug, 61 schools repaired,

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<sup>77</sup> Colin Soloway. *I yelled at them to them to stop* (Newsweek, 7 Oct 2002, <https://www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/earlyBird/Sep2002/e20020930yelled.htm>.)

and 7,000 metric tons of seed provided.<sup>78</sup> In Home Depot, CA soldiers roofed homes in a village near Gardeyz. This was typical of the quiet, professional jobs over 300 CA soldiers did to contribute to the war effort, which was unseen by most and overshadowed by Operation Anaconda. While the humanitarian assistance missions have produced the tangible benefits of untold lives saved, the critical piece in the GWOT is the psychological impact on the uncommitted Muslims in Afghanistan and worldwide who evidence the generosity of Americans, even as they attack their foes. This is the important part of the counterinsurgency campaign that severs the civilian populace from Al-Queda and other Islamist terrorists. When combined with PRC to protect the villagers from Al-Queda and when the Muslim governments are helped with FID missions and receive developmental assistance from the U.S. and world governments, Al-Queda can be defeated. CA, in concert with other SOF assets, government agencies & NGOs, provides the expertise to achieve true synergy of all the parts to bring success to near impossible and overwhelming missions. In this way, Civil Affairs can help “secure the victory” in the GWOT.

### ***Conclusion***

Armies fight for control of people, not terrain. When terrorists and rulers using WMD oppress their people and deprive them of freedom and basic necessities, the United States will target them in the Global War on Terrorism. Al-Queda has formed an umbrella of like-minded terrorist organizations in their insurgency to take over the Muslim world and expand its influence into new regions. Al-Queda can be defeated by

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<sup>78</sup> President Bush, *Operation Enduring Freedom: One Year Accomplishments*,

protecting the civilian population and supporting the legitimacy of existing pro-Western governments. Combat operations must be decentralized and incorporate unusual teamwork among law enforcement agencies, intelligence specialists and economic advisors. Combat will likely occur in urban environments and the enemy will attempt to provoke coalition partners to strike in ways that will create lots of collateral damage that can be exploited in the information war. It will be imperative to incorporate CMO into all missions, because civilians are both the victim and the weapon. The United States has begun the long journey to improve relations with not only the Muslim governments, but also the Muslim population, to prepare for the upcoming conflicts and to prevent future ones.

Al-Queda can be expected to compete to win the will of the people, much as the Viet Cong conducted Dau Tranh. If Islamists can sway the people to change individually, they can change the governments...or remove them. Students of CMO history find many lessons from the Malayan Emergency, CAP, and Home Depot. The Malayan Emergency highlights the importance of winning the Information Operations battle to build support for the COIN and to decrease support for the insurgents. Perseverance and strict rules of engagement are required in counter-insurgencies. The conflicts may last for years before coming to a final resolution. The U.S. military may not remain in these countries for years, but CA soldiers tend to remain longer than combat forces to assist in the transition to other agencies and the HN government. Simultaneous with combat operations to defeat the insurgents must be development initiatives to improve the quality of life for the civilians. Economic assistance, human

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<http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/defense/enduringfreedom.html>.

rights improvements, food and jobs must evidence progress to create genuine hope and restore freedoms. Failure to do so will provide fuel for the insurgent cause. The IDAD efforts must be coordinated to achieve true synchronization of efforts and “the team” should be broader than only the military forces; it should also include intelligence assets, police, and civilian authorities. The civilians must be involved in solving their own problems with their own resources to create a smooth transition when the military departs.

The CAP program highlighted the tremendous benefit in integrating soldiers into the village and hamlet-levels to earn the right to help. Once that trust was built, they were able to protect and better the villagers in a manner that included them in determining their own futures. Capitalism and democratic principles were introduced at a grass-roots level that was highly successful, and worked in concert with efforts to introduce the same at the government level. Creative solutions were found to create work and solve problems that involved the village leadership and upheld their authority. The CAP program also showed weaknesses, in the lack of adequate language, PSYOP and CMO training.

Operation Home Depot and related CMO were executed brilliantly. The simultaneous combat operations and Humanitarian Assistance operations showed an awareness of the civil and military dimensions on today’s battlefield. Another successful idea was combining CA with Special Forces and PSYOPs teams to live in Afghan villages and towns. This created a formidable team that could provide assistance, protection, and psychological reinforcement. These SOF have received adequate cultural

and language training, but these skills must be maintained in peacetime to preserve their effectiveness. The CMOC continued to prove its worth as a coordination center for military and civilian activities. This is the hub of CMO and key to a successful transition to the HN government that can generate policies for the good of its own people. An automated humanitarian targeting board is an example of an initiative that CMO planners are beginning to incorporate into CMOCs to aid CMO planners in identifying civil COGs to “attack.” The CMO is also place to invite the media. Media must be included in all CMO to assist in winning the IO battle. Public Affairs and PSYOP soldiers must also find the best method to get the “message” out to the tribal leaders and peasants, not just Westerners and government leaders. The decentralized nature of the GWOT shows that CA units must be attached down to battalion-sized conventional units to offer the assistance that commanders need to succeed in their mission. CMO is a commander issue and if CA soldiers are assigned, commanders must ensure that they have dedicated logistical support and financial resources to finish quick and timely projects. Due to the high demand for CA units, efforts should be considered in the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command to rotate units on “alert” to improve responsiveness by lessening the time required for mobilization. A final recommendation is to maintain a standing CJCMOTF structure at Geographic Commands to speed the formation and functionality of conducting CMO, since this is a requirement in times of peace and war. CMO have eclipsed their scope since World War II and will only increase in the years ahead. A cell with at least one USAR Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) Lieutenant Colonel and one Major Civil Affairs planners could make the necessary coordination to conduct CMO in any joint Operations Plan. This cell could be

expanded upon mobilization of the regionally assigned USAR Civil Affairs Command, with officers from the mobilized unit or from USACAPOC.

U.S. Army Civil Affairs match deeds to words. They are combat and diplomatic multipliers that bring immediate, direct and tangible benefits to the lives of the local population. This supports the military commander by reducing civilian interference and aids the smooth and quick transition to indigenous civilian control. Civil Affairs personnel are key to shaping the conditions for success in the Global War on Terrorism. Their skill in Humanitarian Assistance and Populace and Resources Control are important elements in defeating the regional insurgency of Al-Queda by restoring hope for freedom. When used in concert with other elements of national power, victory will not only be achieved, it will be secure.

## ***GLOSSARY***

**Centers of gravity** (JP 1-02) — Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. (Army) — The hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. Also called **COGs**.

**Civil Administration** (JP 1-02) - An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. Also called **CA administration**.

**Civil Affairs** (JP 1-02) - Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called **CA**.

**Civil Affairs Activities** (JP 1-02) - Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations.

**Civil Centers of Gravity** (ST 3-05.401) - The civil center of gravity is an element of a civil institution that when engaged will result in a change that has a cascading impact on the entire system, resulting in furthering the achievement of stated objectives.

**Civil-Military Operations** (JP 1-02) - The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called **CMO**. – (FM 101-5-1) — The complex of activities in support of military operations embracing the interaction between the military force and civilian authorities fostering the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, and behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups.

**Civil-Military Operations Center** (JP 1-02) An ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. Also called **CMOC**. (FM 101-5-1) - An operations center formed from civil affairs assets that serves as the primary interface between the US armed forces and the local civilian population, humanitarian organizations, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, United Nations and other international agencies, multinational military forces, and other agencies of the US government. The primary purpose of the CMOC is to ensure continuous coordination among the

key participants in a given area with regards to civil military matters. It is a flexible, mission-dependent organization that can be formed at brigade through joint levels of command.

**Counterinsurgency** (JP 1-02) — Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called **COIN**.

**Critical Capability** (MCDP 1-0) – An inherent ability that enables a center of gravity to function as such. Also called **CC**.

**Critical Vulnerabilities** (MCDP 1-0) – An aspect of a center of gravity that if exploited will do the most significant damage to an adversary's ability to resist. A vulnerability cannot be critical unless it undermines a key strength. Also called **CV**.

**Dislocated Civilian** (JP 1-02) — A broad term that includes a displaced person, a stateless person, an evacuee, an expellee, or a refugee. Also called **DC**.

**Displaced Person** (JP 1-02) — A civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundaries of his or her country.

**Emergency Services** (JP 3-57) – all those activities and measures designed or undertaken to: minimize the effects upon the civilian population which would be caused by a disaster; deal with the immediate emergency conditions which would be created by any such disaster; and effect emergency repairs to, or the emergency restoration of, vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by any such disaster. Also called **ES**.

**Evacuee** (JP 1-02) — A civilian removed from a place of residence by military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation.

**Expellee** (JP 1-02) — A civilian outside the boundaries of the country of his or her nationality or ethnic origin who is being forcibly repatriated to that country or to a third country for political or other purposes.

**Foreign Internal Defense** (JP 1-02) — Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called **FID**.

**Foreign Humanitarian Assistance** — Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. FHA operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. Also called **FHA**. Previously called **HA**.

**Foreign Nation Support** (FM 41-10) - Identification, negotiation, and procurement of available resources within a foreign nation to support U.S. military missions during wartime, preparation for war, or peacetime. The identification, coordination, and acquisition of foreign nation resources, such as supplies, material, and labor, to support U.S. military forces and operations. Also called **FNS**.



**Guerrilla warfare** (JP 1-02, NATO) — Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. Also called **GW**.

**Humanitarian and Civic Assistance** — Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by title 10, United States Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. Also called **HCA**.

**Host Nation** — A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called **HN**.

**Insurgency** (JP 1-02, NATO) — An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.

**Interagency Coordination** — Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective.

**Internal Defense And Development** (JP 1-02) - The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Also called **IDAD**.

**International Organization** — Organizations with global mandates, generally funded by contributions from national governments. Examples include the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Organization for Migration, and United Nation agencies. Also called **IO**.

**Military Civic Action** (JP 3-57) – The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic action in overseas areas.). Also called **MCA**.

**Noncombatant Evacuation Operations** (JP 1-02) — Operations directed by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, or other appropriate authority whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or to the United States. Also called **NEOs**.

**Nongovernmental Organization** (JP 1-02) — Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. NGOs may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups

with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). NGO is a term normally used by non-US organizations. Also called **NGOs**. (Army) — NGO is the equivalent of the term private voluntary organization (PVO) used in the United States.

**Population and Resources Control** (FM 41-10) - Operations in PRC provide security for the populace, deny personnel and materiel to the enemy, mobilize population and materiel resources, and detect and reduce the effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace controls include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and resettlement of villagers. Resources control measures include licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints (for example, roadblocks), ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities. Most military operations employ some type of PRC measures. Although the services and other government agencies may employ PRC measures, CA personnel are also trained to support these agencies in PRC. Two subdivisions of PRC operations are Displaced Civilians (DC) operations and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs). Also called PRC.

**Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO)** (JP 1-02) — Private, nonprofit humanitarian assistance organizations involved in development and relief activities. PVOs are normally US-based. "Private voluntary organization" is often used synonymously with the term "nongovernmental organization." (This term is being removed from next edition of JP 1-02).

**Refugee** (JP 1-02) — A person who, by reason of real or imagined danger, has left their home country or country of their nationality and is unwilling or unable to return.

**Stateless person** (JP 1-02) — Civilian who has been denationalized or whose country of origin cannot be determined or who cannot establish a right to the nationality claimed.

**Subversion** (JP 1-02) — Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime.

**Terrorism** (JP 1-02) — The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.

**Unconventional Warfare** (JP 1-02) — A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. Also called **UW**.

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